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I n a five to four decision, the United States Supreme 
Court in Old Chief v. United 
States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997), held 
that where the sole purpose of 
evidence was to prove the requisite 
element of prior conviction, the 
district court abused its discretion 
by choosing to admit the full 
record of a prior judgment despite 
the petitioner's offer to admit to a 
prior conviction. Consequently, 
the petitioner, charged with 
possession of a firearm by a felon, 
was not allowed to stipulate to the 
fact that he was a felon. In so 
holding, the Court prevents the 
prosecution from presenting the 
fact-finder with evidence concern-
ing a prior felony, in an attempt to 
eliminate the prejudicial effect that 
such evidence creates. Further-
more, this holding prevents the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
balancing test, used to determine 
whether the probative value of a 
piece of evidence is substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect, from being violated. 
In 1993, Johnny Lynn Old 
Chief ("Petitioner") was arrested 
after an incident involving at least 
one gunshot. Petitioner was 
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1), which makes it unlaw-
ful for persons convicted of a 
crime punishable by more than one 
year imprisonment (i.e., a felony) 
to possess a firearm. Petitioner 
had previously been convicted of 
assault causing serious bodily 
injury. 
At trial in the United States 
Old Chiefv. United States 
Abuse Of Discretion 
To Admit The Full 
Record Of Prior 
Judgment Of 
Conviction When 
Defendant Offers To 
Stipulate 
By Karen L. Sterner 
District Court for the District of 
Montana, fearing that such 
evidence would prejudice the jury 
against him, Petitioner offered to 
stipulate to his prior felony convic-
tion. The prosecution, however, 
refused to accept the stipulation. 
Petitioner argued that evidence of 
the name and nature of his prior 
conviction was inadmissible once 
he had offered to stipulate to the 
prior conviction element of his 
current offense. Nonetheless, the 
district court rejected Petitioner's 
offer to concede to a prior 
judgment and admitted the full 
judgment record over his objec-
tion. Consequently, Petitioner was 
convicted of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm, using or 
carrying a firearm during the 
commission of a violent crime and 
assault with a dangerous weapon. 
Petitioner appealed his convic-
tions to the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, stating that the 
convictions resulted from the 
prosecution's refusal to accept his 
stipulation to the fact that he was a 
felon. Petitioner contended that 
the full evidentiary inclusion of his 
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prior conviction may have unduly 
prejudiced the jury against him. 
The court of appeals, however, 
affirmed the district court convic-
tion, holding that the government 
was allowed to prove its case in 
the manner the state considered 
most effective. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to settle the divided treatment of 
this issue by the circuit courts of 
appeal. 
Beginning its analysis, the 
Court addressed Petitioner's thres-
hold argument that his prior 
conviction was not relevant to the 
case at hand. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 
644, 649 (1997). The Court, to the 
contrary, found that his prior 
conviction was essential to the 
current charges because it showed 
that he was "within the particular 
sub-class of offenders for whom 
firearms possession is outlawed by 
§ 922(g)(1)." Id. By applying the 
definition of relevant evidence, the 
Court concluded that information 
concerning Old Chief s prior 
conviction was relevant because it 
made it more probable than not 
that he was a member in the sub-
class of offenders affected by § 
922(g)(1). Id. at 649-50. 
In evaluating the relative 
weight and importance of the 
evidence, the Supreme Court relied 
on the balancing test prescribed by 
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, that states even if 
evidence is relevant it can be ex-
cluded if the "probative value [of 
the evidence] is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair 
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prejudice." Id. at 650 (quoting 
FED. R. EVID. 403). The Court 
concluded that the prejudice to the 
petitioner by refusing his stipula-
tion and revealing his prior 
conviction for assault to the jury 
substantially outweighed the pro-
bative value of introducing the 
evidence as proof of his prior con-
viction. Id. 
The Court further characterized 
"unfair prejudice" as when a fact-
finder improperly bases its decis-
ion of guilt on something other 
than specific proof relating to the 
charged offense. Id. Under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b), 
"evidence of other crimes, wrongs 
or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity 
therewith." Id. at 651 (citing FED. 
R. EVID. 404(b)). Thus, propensity 
character evidence is prohibited to 
prove conduct. Id. While pro-
pensity evidence may be admis-
sible for other purposes, it was 
inapplicable in Petitioner's case. 
Id. In the Court's majority 
opinion, unfair prejudice would 
occur if evidence of a prior con-
viction was misused as propensity 
evidence. Id. at 650. Moreover, 
generalization via propensity evi-
dence adversely affects defendants 
by increasing the chances that a 
fact-finder will view them as likely 
to have committed the crime with 
which they are currently charged. 
Id. Accordingly, evidence of a 
prior conviction is subject to anal-
ysis for probative value and for 
prejudicial risk of misuse as 
propensity evidence. Id. at 651. 
Available substitutes and alter-
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natives to proffered prejudicial 
evidence also need to be evaluated 
in terms of whether they are of less 
prejudicial but equally probative 
value. Id. at 652. In its analysis, 
the Court referred to the Advisory 
Committee Notes to Rule 403, that 
caution a court that is considering 
whether to exclude evidence on 
grounds of unfair prejudice to 
evaluate the "availability of other 
means of proof' as a factor. Id. at 
652 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403 
advisory committee's notes). 
Case law supports the 
contention that the government 
may prove its case by evidence of 
its choice. Id. at 653 (citing Parr 
v. United States, 255 F.2d 86 (5th 
Cir. 1958)). In the Court's 
opinion, however, "[t]he issue is 
not whether concrete details of the 
prior crime should come to the 
jurors' attention but whether the 
name or general character of that 
crime is to be disclosed." Id. at 
655. The Court concluded that 
disclosure of the fact of the quali-
fying conviction is what matters 
under the statute. Id. Finally, the 
Court noted that "there is no 
cognizable difference between the 
evidentiary significance of an ad-
mission and of the legitimately 
probative component of the 
official record the prosecution 
would prefer to place in evidence." 
Id. The latter carries with it, 
however, an inherent risk of unfair 
prejUdice. Id. Therefore, the 
Court determined it was an abuse 
of discretion to admit the record, in 
as much as the probative value 
associated with the conviction did 
not substantially outweigh its dan-
ger of unfair prejudice. Id. 
Furthermore, the Court was. 
careful to confine the scope of its 
ruling to stipulations concerning 
proof of a defendant's legal status, 
and not to other situations at trial 
where stipulations may be 
attempted. Id. at 655-656. A 
criminal defendant may not, for 
example, attempt to lessen the 
impact of the prosecution's evi-
dentiary case with regard to his or 
her participation in the com-
mission of the crime for which the 
defendant is being tried. Id. at 
653. 
Additionally, the Court offered 
alternatives to a formal stipulation 
for the record that, when coupled 
with a proper objection at trial, 
would require a district court to 
exclude evidence of the name of 
the offense because of its 
prejudicial effect. Id. at 655 n.l O. 
The most commonly used is a 
redacted record of a conviction. 
Id. The Court recognized that by 
choosing such an alternative, a 
jury instruction would be neces-
sary to clearly and fully explain its 
meaning, i.e., that it was sufficient 
to satisfy the required status 
element. Id. 
In her dissenting opinion, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
Justice O'Connor stated that the 
majority misapplied Federal Rule 
of Evidence 403. Id. at 656. The 
dissent first pointed out that 
"virtually all evidence is pre-
judicial" or it would not be rele-
vant. Id. (citing Dollar v. Long 
Mfg., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th 
Cir. 1977)). The dissenters posited 
that the key to the admission of the 
evidence was whether or not the 
prejudice created by the admission 
was unfair. Id. at 657 Further-
more, the dissent argued that any 
prejudicial effect of refusing the 
stipulation and admitting evidence 
of a prior conviction could be 
rectified by a proper jury instruc-
tion. Id at 658. Lastly, the dissent 
was troubled by "the Court's 
retreat from the fundamental prin-
ciple that in a criminal prosecution 
the Government may prove its case 
as it sees fit." Id at 658. The 
dissent regarded this action as a 
preclusion of the government's 
ability to offer evidentiary testi-
mony to adequately and effectively 
prove a necessary element of its 
case. Id. 
With its decision in Old Chief 
v. United States, the United States 
Supreme Court settled the dispute 
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among the circuits concerning the 
acceptance of criminal stipula-
tions, and adopted the Fourth 
Circuit's view that criminal stip-
ulations regarding prior crimes 
must be accepted by the prosecu-
tion. Although this case involved 
the federal rules, Maryland, as well 
as other states, could be impacted 
because of the similarity between 
state and federal evidentiary rules. 
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